"Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Research in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, and Iraq "

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"Peace Building Seminar", hosted by Baghdad University and Japan Embassy in Baghdad

18 February 2019

Road Map

1) Theoretical Argument of "Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding", including my experience in Afghanistan

2) South Sudan (Inclusivity was collapsed)

3) East Timor (Inclusivity is maintained.)

4) Syria (Military victory, but challenge.)

5) Iraq and Possible Collaboration between Baghdad Univ and Sophia Univ

Intro. 1993-2004 Program Director at NHK (Japan Public TV Network)

- "Why Did We Go to War: Dialogue of Former Leaders in Vietnam War" (1998)
- "How Far Will the Chain of Hatred Continue in the Middle East" (2002)
- "Struggle of South Korea to Avert Nuclear Conflict" (2003)
- "Rebuilding Iraq: Challenge of the UN" : Silver Medal from UN Correspondents Association(2004)

Academic and UN

2004-06 MA in Political Science at UBC

2006-2009 Ph.D. in Political Science at UBC
 (Field Research in Afghanistan/East Timor)

2009-2010 Dec: Political Affairs Officer in UNAMA (Team Leader for Reconciliation and Reintegration)

2011-12 Aug: Associate Professor, U of Tokyo

2012 July: Completed Ph.D

Academic and UN 2

2012 Aug-2014 Aug: Minister-Counsellor in Japanese mission to the UN

(Directing the team on PBC and mediation)

2014 Aug-2016 March: University of Tokyo

(March 2015: "Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding (Routledge)"

2016 April: Associate Professor, Sophia University in Tokyo (tenure position)

2018 April: Professor

Argument in my book

"Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone and East Timor"

(Routledge: March 2015)

(Paperback version, October 2016)

What is the legitimacy?

Ian Hurd defines legitimacy as "a normative belief that a rule or institution is to be obeyed."

Thomas Frank argues that legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or of the rule-making institution and not by the coercive authority. It exerts a claim to compliance in the "voluntarist mode."

Legitimate Government

The government under which the majority of people obey with its rules and institutions not by coercion but by the conviction that complying is the right thing to do.

Once the governments in post-conflict settings become legitimate in the eyes of local people, they are very likely to achieve sustained peace and stability.

My argument on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding (assuming the creation of democratic institutions)

Critical Factors that might have impacts on creating legitimate government

1. **Role of the UN**
2. **Inclusiveness(Reconciliation)**
3 **Resource Distribution**
4. **Level of Forces (Coercion)**

Credibility as Impartial

Compliance   Non-Compliance

(to Election, Constitution, Demobilization)

Repeated Compliance
(Change of Interest & Identities?)

Repeated Non-Compliance

Legitimate Government   Erosion of Government

My Argument

The contemporary arguments emphasize resource distribution(money) and level of forces (gun); I argue that <u>in addition to these two factors, role of the UN (or credible third party) and the inclusive political process are crucial in creating repeated compliance</u> with major political programs such as elections, constitutions, and disarmaments, then in <u>creating legitimate governments</u> in the long run.

My Argument

- UN missions with international legitimacy might not induce compliance by local people in direct ways; but UN seems to have comparative advantage in giving a sense of impartiality and fairness to the processes of political programs (eg, elections, constitutions, disarmaments)

First Study: Afghanistan

- Peacebuilding in Afghanistan started from 2001 after US attacked Afghanistan.

- The Taliban has regrouped and expanded the territory since 2006.

Research in Afghanistan 2008

SOURCE: Afghan Interior Ministry/Reuters

Individual Interviews in Kabul

70 interviews with top leaderships of Afghan government and the UN (and UN agencies.)

Mr. Zia (Minister of MRRD)

Mr. Ahadi(Minister of Finance)

Opinion Survey

Kandahar Province: 50

Wardak Province: 102

Kapisa Province: 108

- Group meetings in the centers of the provinces.
- Pashtun and Dari version of questionnaires

Majority of Afghan People Support Reconciliation

94% Kandahar (Pashtun), 98 % Wardak (Pashtun), 86% Kapisa (Tajik) in 2008 responded that "Reconciliation with Insurgent groups, including Taliban, is the first priority to establish peace."

98% Kandahar, 98% Wardak, 70% Kapisa support the coalition government between Karzai and the Taliban.

Japanese Book in 2009

I published the Japanese book, titled "Peacebuilding (Heiwakouchiku)" in 2009 based on my field research in Afghanistan and East Timor. In the book, I made some specific policy recommendation for Japan to support establishing a new reconciliation mechanism in Afghanistan to create peace and stability, and establish the legitimate government in the long run.

Proposal and Policy

2009 June – 2009 Nov: Presentations about my policy proposal to top leadership of Japan and some in the US.

2009 Nov : The Japanese government announced that it would support the reconciliation and reintegration as one of three key strategies for assisting Afghanistan.

Establishing Mechanism

(I worked for UNAMA from Dec 2009 to Dec 2010 as a Team Leader for Reconciliation)

- Afghan High Peace Council (negotiating with top leadership of the Taliban)

- Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program

- APRP Trust Fund funded by <u>USA, Japan, UK, Australia, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Spain, and South Korea (About 200 Million USD)</u>.

Development

2011: President Obama announced that it need political solution in Afghanistan.

2012: Taliban announced that it will open the Qatar office to negotiate (Suspended)

2013: Taliban opened the Qatar office (objected by President Karzai)

2014: Presidential Election

2015 (May): Taliban and Afghan G had political talk to start the negotiation.

Political Process in 2012-2018

<u>2015 June</u>: 2 weeks after the Afghan Government, Taliban, US, Pakistan, and China started formal negotiation, there was a leak that the Taliban leader (Mullar Omar) was dead two years ago. It resulted in a internal fighting among the Taliban leadership.

<u>2018 June</u>: Three days' ceasefire. But no sustainable negotiation.

<u>Creating the sustainable framework for inclusive political process had been challenged in Afghanistan</u>.

Political Process in 2019

2019 Jan: USA and the Taliban had direct talk for 6 days in Qatar.

Understanding

USA: Withdrawal of US forces from Afghan.

The Taliban: Will not allow Al-Qaida or ISIS in Afghanistan.

Challenges of Peace Talk in Afghanistan

<u>The Taliban</u>: If USA and the Taliban agree on the timeframe of the withdrawal of US forces, it will start the talk with the Afghan G.

Challenges

Is the Taliban ready to accept the democratic election as a method to choose the leaders of the government in Afghanistan?

Case 2:
South Sudan Peacebuilding

1) After 30 years' war against the Sudanese government, South Sudan became independent in July 2011.

2) But the inclusive government was collapsed in the end of 2013 in South Sudan and civil war started.

   Why is inclusive process so difficult?

   (Research Fund of "Peacebuilding and Political Exclusion" adopted in 2016.)

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
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Research on South Sudan Peace Process

July 2011: Independence of South Sudan

July 2013: Riek Machar, Vice President of South Sudan was fired by President Salvar Kiir.

Dec 2013: Civil war started.

Political and Military Rivalry

President Kirr (Dinka)

Vice President Machar (Nuel)

Research on South Sudan Peace Process 2

Aug 2015: Peace Agreement between President Kiir and Riek Machar

April 2016: Riek Machar returned to Juba and Transitional Government of National Unity was formed.

July 2016: Military Clash again

Field Researches in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda in 2016, 2017, and 2018

James Morgan, South Sudan Amb. to AU in Ethiopia (<u>President Kirr side</u>)

Peter Adwak, former Minister of High Education (<u>Advisor to Machar</u>)

Many Interviews with mediators, including

Director of IGAD（East Africa Regional Organization) which is in charge of South Sudan mediation

UN Special Envoy to AU

Challenges of Inclusivity in South Sudan

Many mediators argued that the relationship between President Kirr's faction and Machar's faction is not the relation of mistrust, but **the relation of hatred**.

From 2016 to 2018, the civil war resulted in **2.2million IDP and 2 million refugees** from South Sudan.

Refugee Camps in Uganda
March 2018

Refugee Camps in Uganda
March 2018

Refugee Camps in Uganda March 2018

My current policy proposals to the Japanese government

(<u>Japan decided to withdraw 350 Self-Defense Forces from UN PKO mission in South Sudan in the end of May 2017</u>.)

1) I proposed the Japanese Gov. to start training South Sudan young bureaucrats in neighboring countries, inviting different tribe groups so that <u>they can learn not only how to run the government but also learn how to work together</u>.

My current policy proposals to the Japanese government

2) Expanding the training program by Japan Self-Defense Force for African Peacekeepers in Nairobi

3) Dispatching Self Defense Forces to other UN PKO missions

Revitalized Peace Process

<u>12 September 2018</u>: President Kirr, Vice President Machar, and other opposition groups agreed on a new peace deal, under the pressure and persuasion of Sudan and Uganda, (and IGAD).

There was also pressure by the UN Security Council for possible target sanctions.

<u>But, the implementation of the agreement will be extremely challenging</u>.

Ismail Wais, IGAD Envoy for South Sudan 6 Nov 2018 (Sophia Univ.)

Ismail Wais IGAD Envoy for South Sudan 6 Nov 2018 (Sophia Univ.)

My argument on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding

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
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
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Case 3) East Timor

1) I conducted academic research in 2008 for one month, interviewing top leaders of the government, UN officials, and collecting 312 opinion survey.

2) I conducted a study-tour in East Timor in March 2017, with 13 students from Sophia.

History of East Timor

- East Timor becomes independent in 1999 after 30 years' occupation by Indonesia.
- UN PKO missions withdrew from E Timor in 2005.
- There was a clash between the supporters of Xanana Gusmao (President) and Mari Alkatiri (Prime Minister) in 2006.
- Alkatiri resigned and UN PKO returned to E. Timor in 2006.

Political Rivalry

Xanana Gusumao(CNRT)

Mari Alkatiri (FRETILIN)

History of East Timor (2)

- There was national election in 2007. Gusmao becomes prime minister.

- Then Gusmao respected Alkatiri and his party (FRETILIN) in nation-building process after 2007.

- **In 2015, when Gusuma resigned as prime minister, he appointed Araujo, who was a member of FRETILIN, as his successor (prime minister).**

My study tour to East Timor in March 2017

- When I conducted study-tour to East Timor in March 2017 just before the Presidential Election, I interviewed both Gusmao and Alkatiri.

- Both Gusmao and Alkatiri supported the same candidate for next President.

- NHK broadcasted my study-tour on 17 March 2017 in its English program that was broadcast over the world.

Criticality of Inclusive Process in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

The case of Afghanistan, South Sudan, and East Timor (and Iraq) continue to demonstrate the critical importance of inclusive political process. Without it, the post-conflict peacebuilding tends to go back to civil war very quickly.

Case 4) Syria

1) **It is the peace process during on-going conflicts (Mediation).**

2) There is a substantial risk (or possibility) that the war will be ended by the military victory of the government, supported by global and regional powers.

3) UN, defined by the Resolution 2254, is pushing a political transition (transitional government, constitutional reform, and elections.)

Civil War in Syria

<u>2011</u>: The civil war started between the government and oppositions.

<u>2012</u>: Geneva Communique, mediated by Kofi Annan. Then Annan resigned.

<u>2014</u>: Geneva II Conference failed. Brahimi resigned. Stafan de Mistura was inaugurated as Special Envoy for Syria.

<u>2014</u>: ISIS was expanded.

<u>2015</u>: Russian military intervention began.

Military Balance of Syria (January 2016)

Military Balance of Syria (October 2017)

NHK News Room Tokyo

I conducted field research in Lebanon and Geneva for 5 weeks to interview many Syrian refugees and representatives of the Syrian government, oppositions, UN Special Envoy for Syria, and key member states including USA, Russia, EU, Saudi, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Japan.

I shared the outcomes of research in NHK program (News Room Tokyo) on 27 Sep 2017.

NHK Program on Peacebuilding

You may see my TV presentations in NHK (Japan Public TV station) as follows:

17 March 2017: Peace in East Timor:

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/newsroomtokyo/features/20170317.html

27 Sep 2017: Syria Peace Process:

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/editors/5/demisturaspeaksonhisstrategyforsyria/index.html

You can search it in Google, "Higashi NHK Syria (or East Timor or South Sudan or Afghanistan)

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
Military Balance of Syria (Oct 2018)

Staffan de Mistura, UN Special Envoy for Syria (2017 Sep)

"I am not naïve to tell that there is no possibility of military end. However, **if there is no political solution, chronical insurgency would be continued.**"

Logic for Inclusivity in Mediation

The logic by UN Special Envoy is to persuade the Syrian government to accept historical lesson that <u>excluding certain political group (Sunni groups in the case of Syria) is very likely to result in the relapse of conflicts</u>.

Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq

5) Challenges of Iraq Peacebuilding

- I have been studying Iraqi nation building since 2004 when I produced TV program, "Rebuilding Iraq: Challenges of the United Nations" that was broadcast in 2004.

- I came to Baghdad in Iraq in February 2018, assigned by Foreign Minister of Japan, to make intellectual contributions on Iraqi peacebuilding.

Lessons from Iraq:

My meetings with 3 Vice Presidents (2018)

Mr. Maliki   Mr.Nujafi

Lessons from Iraq

Mr. Allawi   Ms. Ala Talabani

# Key note speech at Al-Naharan Center in Baghdad (19 Feb 2018)

What I found in Iraq in 2018

1) Although the individual strategy might be different, depending on political affiliation (or party), it seems that political leaders have consensus that they need to overcome sectarian politics to create sustainable peace in Iraq.

Estimated civilian fatalities, Iraq, 2003-11

ISIS Territory in Iraq and Syria

ISIS territory 2015 to 2017

How much territory IS has lost since January 2015

IS control, 5 January 2015
IS control, 30 October 2017

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor

BBC

Iraq Civilian Death by Violence

(Source: Iraqi Body Count)

My argument on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding (assuming the creation of democratic institutions)

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How to do it ? Prioritization

1) National Reconciliation (Inclusivity)

- Sustainable dialogue is crucial.

- Iraqi Prime Minister should host dialogue with leaders of political parties constantly.

- **Can Japan host this kinds of seminars with heads of Iraqi major political parties on regular basis?**

How to do it? Prioritization (2)

2) Resource Distribution

- **Reducing corruption with "No Tolerance Policy" is crucial**.

<u>Lesson of Rwanda</u>

1) Strong Political Leadership
2) Creating Office of Ombudsman (OMB) with strong authority and 80 capable staff
3) Governance reform

How to do it ? Prioritization (3)

3) Security Sector Reform (Coercion) :

- Creating military and police that are perceived as "ones for every Iraqi"

<u>Lesson from Japan</u>:

After 10 years of modernization in Japan, Japan created unified military (by conscription) participated by people of all prefectures, and unified police.

Conclusion: Role of Japan as Global Facilitator

I keep insisting that Japan can play a role as "global facilitator" which will facilitate sustainable dialogue among conflicting parties in the different parts of the world.

Possible Collaboration between Universities of Iraq and Japan

1) Can Baghdad University and Sophia University keep dialogue about the challenges of national reconciliations?

2) Possible participations by professors of Baghdad University to my English courses of "Peacebuilding" by Internet and Skype.

3) Mutual learning of peacebuilding by both Iraqi and Japanese people.